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Entrepreneurship in Russia 
Ruta Aidis, Julia Korosteleva, Tomasz Mickiewicz 
 
Abstract 
This paper presents an account of the environment faced by entrepreneurs in Russia. In 
section one we give a brief introduction to the country which is followed by the 
overview of a public policy on small and medium enterprises in the next section. The 
current state of SMEs and some particularities of the entrepreneurial environment are 
discussed in section three, whereas section four focuses on the prospects of 
internationalisation of Russian SMEs. In section five we draw some conclusions.     
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1. Introduction to Russia 
Russia is the world’s largest country, a nuclear superpower with unsurpassed energy 
resources. It also is a country which finds itself at the crossroads of possible 
development paths. Market oriented mechanisms have been introduced but Soviet era 
laws remain on the books. Corruption has become a way of life and freedom of the 
press has been gradually eliminated in early 2000s. Within this backdrop, private 
entrepreneurship has emerged, albeit in a distorted way. To understand Russia’s current 
situation, one needs to understand the dramatic developments that have characterised its 
recent history. 
As the heart of the Soviet empire, Russia had tremendous control of enormous 
amounts of natural resources and human capital.  Yet, twenty years ago, in the late 
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1980s, it was a country where entrepreneurship was marginal1, the economy was 
stagnant and the ruling communist hierarchy had no clear formula for solving the 
deepening crisis. Unfortunately the reforms characterising Russia’s attempts at 
rebuilding statehood after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, first under M. 
Gorbachev and then Boris Y’eltsin were inconsistent and did not foster macroeconomic 
stabilisation. 
However, under the leadership of V. Putin (since 2000), macroeconomic 
stabilisation as well as institutional stability has been achieved. In addition, 
unprecedented increase in the price and demand for oil and gas resources has resulted in 
a rapid growth of Russia’s GDP.   Russia now has a large private sector, though not 
without its limitations. At first glance,  ‘de jure’ regulations often seem reasonable, yet 
it is the selective and arbitrary manner by which they are enforced that results in a lack 
of consistency or stability for firms (Aidis and Adachi 2007; Aidis et al., 2008). In 
addition, the inadequacies of the Soviet system resulted in Russians becoming 
accustomed to a corrupt and malfunctioning legal environment (Gel’man 2004). 
Unfortunately, this negative legacy continues to characterise the business environment 
today. As a result, large, politically connected enterprises dominate Russia’s business 
landscape. Moreover, the lack of universal property rights is reflected by the uneven 
distribution of income, and Russia is plagued by some of the most extreme  social 
differences and pockets of dire poverty (Glaeser et al. 2003; Gerry and Nivorozhkin, 
2008; Buccellato and Mickiewicz, 2008). 
 
2. Government Policy on SMEs and Entrepreneurship  
 Similar to most other economies emerging from the Soviet system, the creation 
of the private sector and the development of entrepreneurship was a new phenomenon 
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for the Russian population.  The first resolution of the Council of Ministers on ‘Primary 
measures on development and state support of small entrepreneurship in Russia’ was 
issued in 1993 and was followed by the Federal Law in 1995 which approved state 
support for small enterprises via regional, sectoral and municipal programmes of 
development. There have also been numerous presidential decrees, governmental 
resolutions and programmes all aimed at creating better legal conditions for small 
entrepreneurship. However, in practice, the vast majority failed to be implemented.  A 
study evaluating the effectiveness of the 1995 Federal Law on SME support indicated 
that nearly 80 per cent of this law was never implemented, due both to the lack of its 
practical applicability as well as the absence of implementation mechanisms (OECD 
2000, p.50).  
In a study of barriers to Russian SMEs, Radaev (2003) identified uncertainty of 
the federal SME policy, the lack of policy coordination at both the federal and regional 
levels, the lack of special-purpose funding and conservatism in financial support policy2 
among the main reasons for the breakdown in Russian SME policy in the late 1990s. In 
addition, the 1998 financial crisis had a significant negative impact on both SME 
support and development.  Instead of assisting SMEs, in the aftermath of the crisis the 
state largely curtailed its support programmes. 
Interestingly, until recently, small enterprises3 were the only legally qualified 
private entity explicitly defined in Russian legislation. The definition for medium-sized 
enterprise was missing. This situation changed in 2007 with the Federal Law ‘On 
Development of Small and Medium Entrepreneurship’, which for the first time provided 
a clear definition of different types of SMEs including micro- (less than 15 employees), 
small (between 16 and 100 employees) and medium-sized (between 101 and 250 
employees) enterprises.  This law also sets two other criteria for SMEs: 1) the 
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independence criterion – i.e. the total percentage of shares owned by the state, local 
government, large companies, foreign individuals and companies should not exceed 25 
per cent; and 2) an upper limit for annual turnover - which should not exceed a limit  set 
by the federal authorities for each SME category once in five years.4 The law further 
differentiates between the following categories of SMEs: legal entities, individual 
entrepreneurs5 and farmers. 
The 2007 law on SME development envisaged the following primary support 
policy measures: special taxation regimes, simplified accounting, financial support, 
business infrastructure development, including the creation of business incubators and 
provision of counselling services, transfer of state and regional property to start-ups at 
favoured conditions, and allocation of state orders to SMEs. This is truly an admirable 
list of support that the government has identified yet it is too early to declare if this new 
initiative will be successfully implemented and have a more substantial impact on 
SMEs as compared with the previous efforts. 
    
2.1 Tax policy 
According to the World Bank’s 2008 Doing Business tax survey, Russia is ranked 130 
out of the 178 participating countries in terms of the quality of its tax regime. The total 
tax rate as a proportion of profit that normally a medium-sized business would pay has 
been steady at the level of 51.4 per cent over 2006-2008. Following the 2001 tax reform 
a profit tax rate was reduced from 35 to 24 per cent, but at the same time all sorts of tax 
privileges were abolished (Radaev 2003, p. 120). 
A large number of SMEs pay taxes in accordance to special tax regimes, namely 
a simplified tax system (UNS), introduced in 1995, and a single tax on businesses’ 
imputed income (ENVD), introduced in 19986. Whereas entrepreneurs have discretion 
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over the adoption of a simplified tax system, a single tax (ENVD) is compulsory for a 
number of business activities subject to regional law.7 Which in practice results in the 
discretion of regional authorities as to which tax regime an SME is able to adopt.  
 Many entrepreneurs find the ENVD system to be inefficient since it is based not 
on actual income but on imputed income8. (Zlobin et al. 2005).   However, in light of 
the mandatory nature of the ENVD, businesses do not have the freedom to transfer to a 
simplified or standard tax system. Prior to 2003, regional authorities set a base yield for 
various types of business activities, subject to an ENVD. Consequentially, this gave 
them significant power over the calculation of the ENVD providing ample opportunities 
for corrupt behaviour to flourish. 
Furthermore, following the tax code amendments in January 2002, social tax 
was excluded from the single tax, significantly increasing the overall tax burden on 
small firms. This caused many small firms to partly move to the shadow economy 
leading to an overall drop in tax collection. As a result, regional authorities raised the 
base yield in the vain hope to compensate for the losses, which only increased the 
incentives for businesses to retreat further into the shadows to avoid the growing tax 
burden. 
A new tax policy, which was introduced on 1 January 2003 and revised in 2006, 
aimed at addressing some of the aforementioned deficiencies, in particular freeing small 
businesses from the social tax, simplifying accounting, and centralising the setting of a 
base yield used in calculation of the imputed income. Thus, the regional authorities 
were no longer allowed to set a base yield. However, in spite of this improvement, 
municipal authorities have gained some discretionary power to regulate a coefficient 
which is used to correct a base yield, taking into consideration some particularities of 
businesses such as the range of goods sold, seasonality of operations and location9. The 
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declared objective was to create opportunities to reduce the tax burden for businesses 
facing the least favourable conditions. However, in reality, this approach has allowed 
municipal authorities to pursue a differential policy towards SMEs favouring well-
connected business owners.    
According to OPORA’s 2006 survey data10, 61 per cent of the interviewed 
entrepreneurs paid a single tax on imputed income. Half of these respondents believed 
that the overall tax burden had increased since the municipalities have obtained some 
discretionary power over the ENVD. A similar percentage of entrepreneurs stated that if 
given the option, they would transfer to a simplified tax system.11 
 
2.2 State financial support 
Though state financial support for SMEs exists, the 2003 OPORA survey of Russian 
SMEs found that 42 percent indicated that one of the main obstacles preventing 
businesses from accessing state finance was lack of information about these 
programmes.  
The 2007 Federal Law set provisions for financial support of SMEs primarily in 
the form of state subsidies and state and municipal guarantee schemes. The federal 
budget funds are provided to Russian regions through various tender schemes 
announced by the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade. Unlike its 
predecessor - the 1995 Law on SME state support - the new Law does not contain the 
provision for subsidised loans to SMEs.     
Currently based on the 2005 Resolution12, state subsidies are largely allocated to 
support export-oriented SMEs, in particular to subsidise up to 50 per cent of their 
interest fees on loans issued to finance the production of goods and services for 
export13; to subsidise up to 50 per cent of costs related to certification of exported 
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goods; to subsidise up to two thirds of costs related to participation of SMEs in 
international fairs and so on. 
Apart from case-by-case financial support, the new state policy sets provisions 
for developing infrastructure for SME financial support, namely providing guarantee 
schemes and creating investment funds which attract venture capital to finance SMEs, 
and, finally, facilitating micro credit financing. The state participates in micro credit 
schemes through providing subsidies to regional and municipal funds, and subsidising 
micro credit institutions such as consumer and agricultural credit cooperatives. 
However, as Figure 1 shows, alongside the dynamic development of the financial sector 
in Russia, the direct provision of funds by the government has shrunk over recent years, 
which paradoxically, is probably a good sign: given the largely unchecked discretionary 
power of officials coupled with corruption, state intervention is more likely to distort 
the competitive environment than provide real assistance to entrepreneurs that display a 
genuine potential for business success. 
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Figure 1: The Typology of Micro Credit Organisations by their Market Share, 
2003-2005 
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Source: RCSME (2007), p.14.  
Key: The inner circle – 2003; the middle circle – 2004; the outer circle – 2005. 
 
Overall, the state policy towards SMEs can be regarded as largely declarative in nature, 
inefficient, lacking coordination and poorly implemented at best. Where implemented, 
these policies tend to be used to favour the businesses that have close ties to government 
officials to the detriment of businesses that do not. In addition, the legacy of corruption 
and favouritism inherited from the Soviet period results in many Russians simply 
accepting the lack of ‘level playing field’ for business development as the norm14.   
 
Table 1: Russian Entrepreneurs’ Awareness of State Support Programmes 
SME Programmes I am aware of these 
programmes and I 
believe that many 
can benefit from 
I am aware of these 
programmes, but I 
believe they will not 
work and there is no 
I am not aware of 
these 
programmes, % 
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them, % benefit from them 
Creation of 
business 
incubators 
10 11 79 
Micro credit 
schemes 
17 14 69 
Subsidising of loan 
interest fee 
16 14 70 
Partial guarantee 
schemes 
18 13 69 
Export support 12 10 78 
Creation of venture 
capital funds  
6 8 86 
Source: OPORA 2006.  
Note: In response to the question: ‘Are you aware of SME state support programmes 
which the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade has realised in the regions, 
and if so, how you evaluate their effectiveness? 
 
3. The Environment for Entrepreneurship and the State of SMEs 
Similarly to many other transition economies, small private enterprises mushroomed in 
Russia at the beginning of 1990s. This development was a result of both the response to 
the availability of tremendous market opportunities as well as the lack of governmental 
regulations.  This growth stagnated in the second half of the 1990s due to increasing 
economic entry barriers, as the initial division of markets was finalised (Radaev 2003).  
Indeed, Broadman (2002) identifies an unprecedented degree of concentration of 
industrial output in Russia. He suggests that at the oblast level this figure could be well 
over 95 per cent while in comparison, the average national 4-firm concentration ratio is 
approximately 60 per cent. This dominance of large vertically integrated enterprises 
poses a real threat to the further growth and development of Russian SMEs not only on 
a purely competitive sense, but perhaps even more importantly, through the preferential 
treatment (both legal and illegal) given to large enterprises by local authorities. Indeed, 
according to the 2006 OPORA study the preferential treatment (both legal and illegal) 
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given to large enterprises by local authorities is of a greater concern to entrepreneurs 
than unscrupulous competition on the part of large businesses15.  
A decrease in the number of SMEs in 2004 (see Table 2) can also be   partly 
attributed to the fact that many individual entrepreneurs failed to re-register their 
businesses that year16. The contribution of Russian SMEs’  to the total annual turnover 
is moderately high and it is likely to be underestimated, given that there is a large 
proportion of small enterprises and individual entrepreneurs who operate in the shadow 
economy17.  
 
Table 2: Small and Medium-sized Enterprises in Russia, 2002-2005 
SME indicators 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Number of SMEs, (000s) 8,000 8,441 6,212 6,891 
Share of SMEs as a % of  total 
number of enterprises,  
 
93 
 
94 
 
92 
 
92 
Market share, as a % of total 
annual turnover 
 
39 
 
47 
 
51 
 
46 
Source: RCSME (2006).  
 Note: SMEs are defined according to the standard EU employment size criterion 
 
However, it is important to note that SMEs are not evenly distributed across Russia. In 
general, they are largely concentrated in the Central and North Western districts, 
whereas individual entrepreneurs and farmers prevail in the Southern district (see Figure 
2).  
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Figure 2: Density of different types of SMEs per thousand of economically active 
population, by Federal Districts, 2005 (in physical units) 
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Source: RCSME (2006)  
Note: SMEs are defined according to the standard EU employment size criterion  
 
The uneven distribution  for regions  ranges from a mere 50 in the Republic of 
Ingushetiya to 186 in Moscow city, when measured per thousand of economically active 
population (RCSME 2006). 
 
3.1. Entrepreneurial Environment 
In March 2005 OPORA  together with VTsIOM, Russia’s public opinion research 
centre, conducted a survey to study the conditions and factors affecting the development 
of small entrepreneurship across the different regions in  Russia ( summarised in Table 
3).  
 On the basis of the results of the survey, OPORA’s experts constructed an 
aggregate index for each of the key indicator variables, characterising the 
entrepreneurial climate, which allowed assessment of regions’ positions in relation to 
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one another. A ranking greater than 100 suggests that the situation is rather favourable, 
whereas a ranking below 100 suggests the opposite18.  
 
Table 3: Evaluation of the Entrepreneurial Climate in Russia 
Aspect of 
entrepreneurial 
climate 
Brief  description Average 
value of 
the index 
for all 
regions 
Number of 
regions with an 
index over 100 
Financial situation An entrepreneur’s self-
assessment of financial situation 
of his/her business  
124.5 71 
Transaction costs Assessment of the costs related 
to dealing with authorities, 
including business regulation 
and corruption-related expenses 
114.3 68 
Support for small 
entrepreneurs by 
regional & local 
authorities  
Assessment of the treatment of 
small entrepreneurs by regional 
and local authorities, including 
state SME support policies  
113.2 57 
Business motivation Assessment of the conditions of 
business for SME and outlook, 
including business objectives, 
financial results, economic 
situation in the region 
93.5 27 
Level of security Assessment of the risk level of 
interaction with the authorities 
and criminal milieu 
68.7 7 
State of competitive 
environment 
Market entry barriers 75.8 3 
Access to property 
resources 
Assessment of the accessibility 
of production space 
55.3 3 
Legal conditions Adequacy of availability of legal 
(judicial) protection 
47.6 0 
Source: OPORA Russia 2006  
 
As table 3 shows, the majority of Russia’s regions scored favourably (above 100) for 
the three top listed indicators, namely financial situation, transactions costs and state 
support to small entrepreneurs, which seems to indicate that these three issues are not 
the main hindrances facing small entrepreneurs  (OPORA 2006).   
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 Specifically, with regards to the financial situation, more than half of the 
respondents characterised it as ‘relatively favourable’ and ‘stable’ in terms of the 
adequacy of financial resources to sustain business, but it is important to note, not 
enough to grow a business19 (ibid.).  This finding suggests that Russian entrepreneurs 
have learned to adapt and function within the existing ‘restrictive’ conditions relying on 
personal savings. About 54 per cent of the respondents agreed that it was impossible to 
secure a banking loan. Most of these entrepreneurs still largely pursue a survival-
oriented strategy which hampers further business development and growth. In addition, 
widespread corruption may prevent businesses from growing above a threshold level, as 
a means to avoid expropriation by officials, especially tax administrators (Barkhatova, 
2000) and also to avoid engaging in ‘illegal’ practices (Aidis and Adachi, 2007). Sadly, 
many local authorities continue to used their power to extract funds from  entrepreneurs 
treating them as a source of ‘informal’ income rather than viewing them as important 
sources of  regional development, creating local employment, fostering well-being and 
aiding in the eradication of poverty. 
  In general, the poor quality of legislation, its weak enforcement, and lack of 
trust in courts are among the primary characteristics of inadequate legal conditions for 
entrepreneurial development (see also Aidis et al. 2008). In Russia, the OPORA survey 
data suggests the entrepreneurs search for other methods of protecting their interests and 
rights rather than appealing to courts. When asked what their chances of winning their 
case in the court against administrative or municipal authorities, only a meagre 7 per 
cent of the respondents were confident about a positive outcome. 
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4. Internationalisation of entrepreneurs and SMEs: Drivers and Roadblocks 
 Only 13.1 percent of Russian SMEs are exporting, either directly or indirectly, 
according to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s (EBRD) 
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey  
(BEEPS) in 2005. This percentage is far below that of other transition countries in 
Central Europe though it falls within a similar range with other Western CIS countries 
(see Figure 3). 
This outcome may be partially explained by the negative impact of the 
appreciation of the rouble driven by revenue from oil and gas exports (i.e. a form of the 
Dutch Disease). But a much greater portion of this situation is attributed to the weak 
institutional environment in Russia. Direct bureaucratic barriers on exporting are one of 
the two most serious barriers identified characterizing Russia’s business environment 
(alongside licensing requirements) as found in the World Bank’s ’Doing Business’ 
(2008) survey. On this dimension Russia ranks a dismal 155 out of 178 countries. In 
particular, this low ranking is attributed to the high cost of exporting which measures 
the fees associated with completing the procedures to export goods, including 
administrative fees for customs clearance and technical control, terminal handling 
charges and inland transport20.  
Tovstiga et al. (2004) identify the internal institutional weakness of the Russian 
business environment as the key factor constraining Russian entrepreneurs from 
internationalising their operations.  The authors also present two additional factors that 
limit Russian entrepreneurs from entering international markets: insufficient 
competences and differences in culture and business practices. Technologically 
advanced sectors could play an important role in exports, yet, Russia’s base of active 
researchers has diminished significantly as throughout the 1990’s scientists have left in 
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search of higher wages and better working conditions. In addition, even those 
researchers who stayed and attempted to set up their own business often lacked the basic 
business skills needed to develop a successful business.   In general, the inheritance of 
Soviet legacies ranging from the isolation of the Soviet economy from market 
mechanisms, to the development of negative cultural practices such as a general 
acceptance of a weak rule of law and corruption did not equip Russian entrepreneurs 
with adequate skills and understanding of how to succeed in the international business 
environment. 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 Overall, despite numerous policy announcements oriented towards 
entrepreneurial development, entrepreneurs in Russia face a hostile business 
environment characterised by the weak rule of law and widespread corruption.  As 
formal structures in Russia fail, they are complemented by informal networks, which 
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form ‘intangible assets’ for certain well-connected entrepreneurs that allow them to 
overcome environmental barriers (Aidis et al. 2008). However, though some businesses 
learn to cope, the lack of a level playing field for businesses in general seriously distorts 
the development of a thriving business environment. The crucial issue is not the 
existence and number of small businesses, but rather the fact that most of them have 
either no incentive to grow or are severely restricted in doing so given that if they are 
successful they face a serious risk of expropriation or forced takeover by those better 
connected to the intertwined economic and political structures of power.  
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1 Private enterprise was severely restricted under the Soviet system. 
2 There has prevailed direct case-by-case SME financial support in Russia. Though acknowledging the 
importance to move away from direct assistance to an indirect SME support through creating a favourable 
business environment, Russian authorities have been largely reluctant to do this, as this would limit their 
command over distribution of designated financial resources and therefore reduce their authority (Radaev 
2003).    
3 Small enterprises were defined on basis of employment size criteria set for different branches of the 
economy (see Russian Federal Law ‘On state support of small enterprises in the Russian Federation’, No. 
88-FZ, 14 June 1995).  
4 Given the fact, that the distinction between different categories of SMEs has only been made very 
recently, this criterion will not be used for a while, as there are no statistical data available yet.    
5 Equivalent of self-employed in the UK. 
6 The adoption of either a simplified tax system or a single tax is subject to meeting certain criteria set in 
the Russian Federation’s Tax Code. Currently, for a firm to be eligible for the simplified tax system 
(UNS), its total revenue (including extraordinary income) should not exceed RUR 15 mln.  In the case of 
a single tax (ENVD), firms should operate in the territory where an ENVD tax is in place and firms’ 
activities fall within the list of business activities, subject to a ENVD, as specified in the Tax Code, 
Chapter 26.3. For example, only retail traders with trading space for each trading unit not exceeding 150 
sq. meters will be subject to an ENVD. In essence, both the UNS and ENVD regimes introduce a single 
tax that replaces a number of taxes, including an income tax, VAT, assessed tax and single social tax 
(excluding mandatory pension fund contributions).  In the case of the UNS, it allows entrepreneurs to 
choose a tax base whether it is a total revenue or net profit. Currently, the tax rates are respectively set at 
6  and 15 percent. Some particularities of calculating an ENVD are discussed further.    
7 By 2002 the respective regional laws had been adopted by the overwhelming majority of the regions of 
the Russian Federation. 
8 Imputed income is the base yield - a conditional monthly income set for certain types of business 
activities by the federal law -, multiplied by a physical indicator, characterising a certain type of 
entrepreneurial activity (e.g. number of employees in the case of veterinary services or parking area in sq. 
meters in the case of parking services).         
9 The value of base yield needs to be multiplied by a corrective coefficient to allow for the differences in 
business conditions. 
10 OPORA is Russia’s NGO representing small and medium-sized enterprises.   
11 It is interesting to note that a corrective coefficient is currently set between 0.005 and 1 (The Tax Code 
of the Russian Federation), that by all means should only decrease the single tax, given that the value of 
base yield is multiplied by this coefficient. Prior to the 2003 tax reform, the coefficient could have both a 
‘decreasing’ and ‘increasing’ power.  However, we anticipate that local authorities may pursue 
differential policies for SMEs, so that enterprises, which are eligible for a similar treatment in terms of the 
corrective coefficient in theory, may pay different tax rates in reality. This may explain the respondents’ 
answers.    
12 See the Resolution of the Council of Ministers No. 249 ‘On conditions and order of providing federal 
budget funds to support small entrepreneurship, including farming’ (22 April 2005 with additions and 
amendments as of 23 February 2007).  
13 An interest rate on rouble loans should not exceed half the refinancing rate set by the Central Bank; for 
loans issued in foreign currency, an interest rate should not exceed 6 per cent per annum.      
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14 Within the Soviet Union, entrepreneurs were considered ‘exploitative capitalists’ and ‘enemies of the 
state’. Even though the new economic system in Russia is based on private ownership and 
entrepreneurship, these negative entrepreneurship stereotypes continue to persist amongst the general 
population.  
15 The responses were respectively 40 and 24 per cent (OPORA 2006).  
16 As of 1 January 2005, only 2.7 out of 4.8 million entrepreneurs re-registered their businesses. Out of 
those who failed to re-register, 20 percent shut down or transformed into enterprises with legal entity; 60 
percent were in essence ‘dead’ businesses and were taken off the register upon the completion of the re-
registration; the rest 20 percent did not undertake their re-registration on time and were given extra time 
to re-register in 2005 that explained an increase in SMEs in that year.  
17 This can be also explained by the way the data has been aggregated, allowing for inclusion of medium-
sized enterprises, defined according to the EU criterion – under 250 employees - whereas according to 
Russia’s Ministry of Statistics SME’s employment size was limited by 100 employees until the adoption 
of the 2007 Law.  
18 For more detail on the methodology used by OPORA’s experts and the results of the survey see 
OPORA (2006). 
19 See also Aidis and Adachi (2007). 
20 Note that this measure excludes tariffs. 
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